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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a dynamic model of a world comprising two economies, each with its 
own currency, which enjoy free trade with one another in both merchandise and financial 
assets. The various domestic and foreign assets are however imperfect substitutes. The path-
breaking paper, which introduced the genre, is Tobin and Macedo (1980). A similar 
construction was proposed by Branson and Henderson (1985), and recapitulated in a review 
of exchange rate theory by Isard (1995). These studies took supplies of bonds on the open 
market as exogenous and concentrated entirely on the way in which a timeless equilibrium 
exchange rate could be determined via resolution of a confrontation between demands and 
supplies of internationally tradeable assets. A fortiori, they ignored the way in which 
exchange rates, once determined in asset markets, feed back so as to change relative prices, 
and therefore trade flows  – and thence the demand for and supply of assets, income flows 
and so back to exchange rates themselves. Nor did they consider alternative “closures” in 
which the exchange rate is taken as exogenous and some other mechanism handles 
imbalances. The purpose of this paper is to amplify the Tobin-Macedo insights by 
characterising some of the relevant dynamic adjustment processes.  
 It will be one of our central contentions that any characterization of a whole 
macroeconomic system should be grounded in a double entry accounting framework which 
combines income/expenditure with flow-of-funds concepts (Godley 1999b). Such a 
framework will make it essential to analyse the behaviour of all parties to any international 
transaction; it also means that the model is complete in the sense that the financial balances of 
every sector have counterpart transactions in stock variables which have, in turn, explicit 
                                                           
1 This work is part of a much larger enterprise that we are carrying out. A textbook/monograph 
on stock-flow-consistent monetary  macroeconomics is in preparation. We are grateful for the 
comments received from various readers, in particular Lance Taylor, Alex Izurieta, Jan Kregel 
and Bill Martin. All simulations were carried out using MODLER software. 
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implications for end-of-period stocks.2 The model presented here, like those mentioned above, 
subsists in an entirely different paradigm from Mundell-Fleming-type models which largely 
ignore the concept of stock equilibrium and attempt to explore the “openness” of a single 
economy without taking explicit account of responses from the rest of the world. Stock 
equilibrium is central to the following analysis, which generates results qualitatively different 
from those based on the Mundell-Fleming model, which is itself based, ultimately, on the IS-
LM model. Our model also generates results qualitatively different from other models, for 
instance the so-called monetary approach to the balance of payments, the inter-temporal 
optimisation models proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and standard post-Keynesian 
models as can be found in McCombie and Thirlwall (1994).   
 The model presented here is a heavily revised version of Godley (1999a) and has 
benefited greatly from related work by Mathieu Lequain (2003). Other open-economy models 
based on the same method can be found in Izurieta (2003) and Lavoie (2003a, 2003b). The 
results are also broadly coherent with those obtained by Lance Taylor (2002), who has based 
his work on our accounting framework but used alternative analytical methods and closures to 
explore its implications. We believe that the post-Keynesian closure adopted in most variants 
of our model, i.e., the assumption that central banks set interest rates rather than attempting to 
target money supplies or the supply of securities, is more realistic and better describes the 
actual behaviour of central banks (Godley 1999b). Indeed, this is also the main assumption of 
the so-called New consensus models, as they can be found among central bank practitioners 
(Meyer 2001) and some New Keynesians (Romer 2000). 
 
2. OVERVIEW 
 
Having set forth the conceptual framework in the form of two matrix tables, the paper first 
summarises the identities describing each economy’s arterial flows. We next present a 
conventional sub-model of real and nominal trade flows in which real exports and imports are 
determined by relative prices and by real output at home and abroad, while trade prices are 
determined by the general level of domestic and foreign prices together with the nominal 
exchange rate. The following section of the paper describes a sub-model of 
income/expenditure transactions which contains a consumption function with the lagged 
stock of real wealth as an argument. This implies, given that the exogenous variables do not 
change, that a quasi stationary steady state (of a kind noted by Godley and Cripps, 1983:294), 
which will be defined below) will be reached  in which the change in real wealth is zero.  
 As the prices of exports, imports and domestic sales vary relative to one another, the 
income/expenditure section perforce includes a rather large number of steps, most of which 
                                                           
2  See also Gray and Gray (1988-89: 241) for the advantages of adopting a flow-of-funds matrix 
for the world, thus identifying the “constraints and interdependencies which must characterize 
the  international financial system” and transforming “balance-of-payments analysis from a 
partial to a general framework”. 
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are no more than simple but tedious accounting relationships. The paper then confronts asset 
demands, which are determined by wealth stocks accumulated by the private sector, allocated 
between individual assets according to Tobinesque principles, with asset supplies which are 
generated by the governments’ fiscal transactions. The penultimate section describes (with 
the aid of numerical simulation) how the model as a whole solves and responds to shocks. For 
instance, we can precisely trace through how, if fiscal and monetary policy are given and the 
exchange rate is fixed, a shock to the exports of one country will result in an equivalent shock 
to imports of the other and a change in both countries’ foreign exchange reserves. We shall 
then be in a position to explore the nature of any effect this might have on each country’s 
monetary system. In the final section we shall also  explore alternative “closures”to the model 
by assuming alternative policy responses – in particular floating the currency or changing 
fiscal or monetary policy.  
 The simplifying assumptions which have been made are enormous.  There is (for 
instance) no domestic or foreign investment in fixed or working capital, no holdings of 
financial assets by firms, no wage inflation and, crucially, neither commercial banking nor 
“hot money”. The government does not follow any solvency rule, nor do the households care 
about the government debt ratio. The treatment of expectations, which are crucially important 
in any real world of floating or managed exchange rates, is rudimentary. These simplifying 
assumptions mean that many of the results of the model must be very heavily qualified.  
 Yet the model already contains ninety-odd equations and each additional realistic 
feature would require several more. At least in the present model there exist (as there exist in 
the real world) at least two parties to each transaction while every financial balance has a 
counterpart change in balance sheets, making the model complete in the vitally important 
sense that the nth equation is logically implied by the other n-1. This completeness even 
provides some ostensive justification for the model by comparison with others which do not 
use a comprehensive accounting framework. Indeed the logical structure of the model and the 
need to find an equation for each of its ninety-odd variables brings a degree of inevitability to 
its overall properties, which might survive alternative specifications of key behavioural 
relationships, for instance the equations describing international trade or the consumption 
function.     
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3. AN ACCOUNTING SYSTEM WITH NO BLACK HOLES 
 
 Table 1:  BALANCE  SHEETS   
            
  Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 Col. 9 Col. 10 
  Households Firms Govt. Central Bank Households Firms Govt. Central Bank 
  “Japan” or “U.K” (#) Exch. Rte. “U.S.” ($) Sum 
  BALANCE  SHEETS 
B1 Cash +H#   -H#  +H$   -H$ 0 
B2 # Bills +B##  -B# +Bcb# .xr# +B$#.xr#    0 
B3 $ Bills +B#$.xr$   +Bcb#$.xr$ .xr# +B$$  -B$ +Bcb$ 0 
B4 Gold    +or#.pg# .xr#    +or$.pg$ Sum or.pg$ 
B5 Balance -V#  NWg#=+B# NWcb# .xr# -V$  NWg$=+B$ 0 -Sum.or.pg$ 
B6 Sum 0  0 0 .xr# 0  0 0 0 
            
 Table 2:  TRANSACTIONS   
            
  Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 Col. 9 Col. 10 
  INCOME - EXPENDITURE TRANSACTIONS Sum 
T1 Consumption -C# +C#    -C$ +C$   0 
T2 Govt.Exp.  +G# -G#    +G$ -G$  0 
T3  -IM#   .xr#  +X$   0 
T4 
Trade 
 +X#   .xr#  -IM$   0 
T5 GDP +Y# -Y#    +Y$ -Y$   0 
T6 Taxes -T#  +T#   -T$  +T$  0 
T7 +r#(-1).B##(-1)  -r#(-1).B#(-1) +r#(-1).Bcb#(-1) .xr# +r#(-1). B$#(-1).xr#    0 
T8 
Interest 
Payments +r$(-1). 
B#$(-1).xr$   
+r$(-1). 
Bcb#$(-1).xr$ .xr# +r$(-1).B$$(-1)  -r$(-1).B$(-1) +r$(-1).Bcb$(-1) 0 
T9 CB profits   +Fb# -Fb#    +Fb$ -Fb$ 0 
 Changes in FLOW OF FUNDS TRANSACTIONS  
T10 Cash -∆H#   +∆H#  -∆H$   +∆H$ 0 
T11 # Bills -∆B##  +∆B# -∆Bcb# .xr# -∆B$#.xr#    0 
T12 $ Bills -∆B#$.xr$   -∆Bcb#$.xr$ .xr$ -∆B$$  +∆B$ -∆Bcb$ 0 
T13 Gold    -∆or#.pg# .xr#    -∆or$.pg$ 0 
T14 Sum 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
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These two tables will provide useful reference points which will assist the exposition which 
follows. Table 1 sets out the balance sheets of our two economies, which will initially be called 
“Japan” and “the US”. As no physical capital exists apart from foreign exchange reserves held in 
the form of gold, every private asset is a financial asset which has a counterpart liability. 
Household wealth has three components, cash (in the domestic currency only), bills issued at 
home and bills issued abroad. Where an asset is issued by one country and held in another, the 
first term in the suffix refers to the country where the asset is held, the second to the country 
where it was issued; thus (for instance) B#$ describes a bill owned by a Japanese household but 
issued in the US.  
 Table 1 also shows that the model assumes that firms hold neither assets nor liabilities 
and  that the government sectors (deprived of their central bank) only issue bills, denominated in 
their own currency. Central banks issue cash money. Their assets are made up of bill holdings 
and of gold (noted “or”, as in the French word for gold). On the assumption that the price of gold 
in US dollars remains constant, the net worth of the US central bank has to be zero. By contrast, 
the net worth of the # central bank (Japan or the UK) may become positive (negative) when 
exchange rates vary, because the # central bank can achieve capital gains (losses) when the # 
currency appreciates (depreciates), that is when the number of yen per dollar ( xr$) goes up 
(down). This occurs because the price of gold is set in dollars, and because the # central bank 
holds bills denominated in dollars. 
 The flow matrix in Table 2 uses a double entry format to describe all transactions within 
and between the two economies and defines all of the nominal variables which will be used. All 
rows and all columns must sum to zero by accounting identity. The left half of Table 2 describes 
all Japanese transactions measured in #s, the right half describes US transactions measured in $s. 
There are seven entries common to both countries, those in rows  3, 4, 7, 8, 11,12 and 13, and in 
each case (accounting) equivalence is brought about by the exchange rate, shown in the central 
column. The top section of the table gives, for each country, simplified components of the 
national income accounts. The middle section of Table 2 describes flows of interest payments. 
The lower third of the table describes transactions in assets – the flow of funds accounts. 
 The assumption that there are no private holdings of foreign cash implies that any 
payments or receipts of foreign currency from trade in goods or assets are exactly and 
simultaneously exchanged by the central bank into its own currency. How the central bank and 
the government then respond to the implied ex ante change in its reserves will have profound 
consequences for the overall outcome.   
 
4. EQUATIONS DEFINING THE MODEL 
 
4.1 Identities describing arterial flows 
The accumulation of private wealth in nominal terms is equal to personal income defined (in line 
with Haig and Simons) to include any capital gains on foreign bills as a result of exchange rate 
changes, less taxes and consumption. 
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(1)        ∆V#  ≡ Y# + r#-1.B##-1 + r$-1.B#$-1.xr$ + ∆xr$.B#$-1 - T# - C#  
(2)                 ≡ YD# - C# 
 
where V is wealth, Y is total factor income, T is taxes, r is the bill rate of interest3,  C is 
consumption and  B is Treasury bills where, recall, the first suffix denotes the country where the 
bill is held and the second denotes the country of origin, while xr is the exchange rate4. Equation 
(2) abbreviates (1) and gives the definition of disposable personal income, YD, which we shall 
use. Equation (1) describes Japanese wealth accumulation denominated in “yen”, hence interest 
payments on US bills (the third term on the RHS) is being converted from dollars into yen using 
the exchange rate. Capital gains (the fourth term on the RHS) describe the change in the yen 
value of previously issued US bills measured in dollars; note that capital gains are not 
transactions and therefore have no place in the matrix’s columns 1 and 6.  
 Equations (3) and (4) give exactly comparable identities for the US.   
 
(3)        ∆V$  ≡ Y$ + r$-1.B$$-1 + r#-1.B$#-1.xr# + ∆xr#.B$#-1 -T$ - C$ 
(4)   ≡ YD$ - C$ 
 
The identities describing the national income at current prices (columns 2 and 6) are: 
 
(5): (6)        Y# ≡ C# + G# + X# - IM# :     Y$ ≡ C$ + G$ + X$ - IM$ 
 
where G is government expenditure, X is exports and IM is imports. 
 As central banks have no interest-paying liabilities, their profits (Fb) are equal to total 
interest receipts from any domestically issued bills, Bcb, plus, as is the case for the Japanese or 
the UK central bank, any foreign Treasury bills, Bcb#$, which they hold, as shown in columns 4 
and 9 of the matrix. 
 
(7): (8)       Fb# ≡ r#-1.Bcb#-1 + r$-1.Bcb#$-1.xr$ :   Fb$ ≡ r$-1.Bbc$-1 
 
 Given that central bank profits are all paid back to the government, we can write the 
(government) budget constraints (columns 3 and 8) as: 
 
(9): (10)       ∆B# ≡ G# - T# + r#-1.B#-1 - Fb# :   ∆B$ ≡ G$ - T$ + r$-1.B$-1 - Fb$ 
 
where, recall, B is bills – the sole liability of the government, as distinct from the whole public 
sector including the central bank. 
                                                           
3  The rate of interest is lagged by one period because the interest payments on the bills that were 
acquired in the previous period are only made in the next period, at time t. But the rate of interest 
on these bills was set at the end of the previous period, at time t-1 when the bills were bought. See 
Turnovsky (1977: 74) and Flaschel, Gong and Semmler (2001: 111).   
4 The dollar rate of exchange is the reciprocal of the # rate of exchange. Both rates of exchange are 
used so that the accuracy of the arrays can be more easily checked out.   
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 It is important to note that payments by the US government on US Treasury bills held by 
the Japanese central bank are comprised within total interest payments by the US, r$-1.B$-1,  the 
third term on the RHS of (10), as is clear from line 8 of the transactions matrix. Hence interest 
payments on US Treasury bills appear as a credit to the Japanese central bank but not as a debit 
to the US central bank.  
 It is a feature of Table 2 which may have seemed surprising that neither country has a 
column describing its balance of payments. However the coherence enforced by double entry 
accounting ensures that total flows into each country always exactly equal total outflows, 
whether measured as current (trade etc.) flows or as capital account transactions. Thus trade 
flows (lines 3 and 4 of the transactions matrix ) plus net flows of interest payments (lines 7 and 
8) make up the balance of payments on current account which is, in turn, exactly equal to the 
sum of each country’s transactions in capital assets shown in lines 11-13. To link the transactions 
described in Table 2 to the balance sheets in Table 1, it will be necessary to take any capital 
gains into account. The balance of payments identities, which are not directly shown in the 
matrix, are: 
   
(11)    CAB# ≡ X# - IM# + r$-1.B#$-1.xr$ - r#-1.B$#-1 + r$-1.Bcb#$-1. xr$  
(12)     CAB#  ≡ - KAB# ≡ ∆B#$s.xr$ - ∆B$#s + ∆Bcb#$s.xr$ + ∆or#.pg# 
(13)    CAB$ ≡ X$ - IM$ + r#-1.B$#-1.xr# - r$.B#$-1 - r$-1.Bcb#$-1.xr# 
(14)     CAB$ ≡ - KAB$ ≡ ∆B$#s .xr# - ∆B#$s - ∆Bcb#$s + ∆or$.pg$ 
 
where CAB is the current account balance, while KAB is the capital account balance, defined 
such that CAB + KAB ≡ 0. In other words, KAB includes the value of the changes in official 
reserves. The current account balance, by the normal NIPA conventions, only records 
transactions and takes no account of capital gains.  
 
4.2 Trade                
Trade prices are assumed to be determined in the following way: 
 
(15)   pm# =  µ0 - µ1. xr# + (1 - µ1).py# + µ1.py$   0 < µ1 < 1 
(16)  px#  =  ν0 - ν1.xr# + (1 - ν1).py# + ν1.py$     0 < ν1 < 1  
 
where pm is import prices, px is export prices, py is the GDP deflator, while bold characters 
denote natural logs of these variables. 
 The justification for the constraints derives from the following propositions which are 
stylised facts, either self evident or well established empirically. 
 1) If there were a simultaneous addition of some given amount to domestic inflation in 
both countries with no change in the exchange rate, then there would be an equivalent addition to 
export and (therefore) import prices in each country – hence the constraint that the coefficients 
on domestic and foreign inflation sum to unity. 
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 2) If depreciation were exactly paralleled by a simultaneous and equal addition to 
domestic inflation, it is reasonable to expect that import prices would rise by the full amount of 
the depreciation – hence the sum of the coefficients on the exchange rate and domestic inflation 
must also sum to unity. It is well established empirically that, following depreciation, and given 
no immediate effect on domestic inflation, export and import prices denominated in home 
currency rise, but there will normally be some deterioration in the terms of trade (i.e., µ1 > <1) 
and vice versa for appreciation. Presumably exporters in both countries adjust prices in order to 
maintain or achieve some desired market share when exchange rates change (as shown by Bloch 
and Olive 1995).  
 Import and export prices for the US now follow by symmetry:  
 
(17)  px$ = pm#.xr# 
(18)  pm$ = px#.xr#  
 
 Trade flows, measured at constant prices, are determined, very conventionally, by 
relative price and income elasticities, with bold variables again representing logs. 
 
(19)  x# = ε0 - ε1(pm$-1 - py$-1) + ε2.y$ 
(20)  im# = η0 - η1(pm#-1 - py#-1) + η2.y# 
 
 Equation (19) says that the volume of Japanese exports (x#) responds with an elasticity of 
ε1 with respect to the price of $ imports relative to that of $ domestic prices and ε2 with respect to 
domestic output (y$). Equation (20) says that Japanese imports (im#) respond with elasticities η1 
with respect to import prices (pm#) relative to domestic prices (py#) and η2 with respect to 
domestic output (y#).  
 As with prices, these equations imply, logically, what dollar export and import volumes 
must be since, at constant prices and base year exchange rates (assumed equal to 1), the exports 
of one country are the imports of the other: 
 
(21): (22)  x$ ≡ im# :  im$ ≡ x# 
 
Finally the four identities generating the values of trade flows in own currency are: 
 
(23): (24)      X# ≡ x#.px#      :        X$ ≡ x$.pm$ 
(25): (26)    IM# ≡ im#.pm#   :       IM$ ≡ im$.pm$  
 
 It is worth pointing out, since it is so often assumed that the sum of the elasticities with 
respect to relative prices must sum to at least one if the trade balance is to improve following 
devaluation (the Marshall-Lerner condition), that in verity the sum of these elasticities need be 
no greater than the elasticity of terms of trade with regard to devaluation. For instance, if the 
deterioration in the terms of trade were 20% of the devaluation, then the sum of the price 
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elasticities need be no more than 0.2. If there were no change at all in the terms of trade 
following devaluation – not an impossible outcome – the sum of the elasticities need be no 
greater than positive for the balance of trade to improve. 
 
4.3 Income and expenditures 
The consumption function, with the wealth acquisition function that this implies, is central to the 
way in which the system is driven towards a steady state. We already have the definition of 
disposable income (YD) from (2) and (4): 
 
(2): (4)        YD# ≡ C# + ∆V# :     YD$ ≡ C$ + ∆V$ 
 
 The change in the real stock of wealth, v, is defined as:  ∆v ≡ V/pds – V-1/pds-1 , where 
pds is the price of domestic sales. 
 Real (inflation accounted) disposable income (yd), once again in line with the Haig-
Simons definition of disposable income, is therefore given by: 
  
(27) : (28)  yd# ≡ YD/pds# - v#-1. ∆pds#/pds# :     yd$ ≡YD$pds$ - v$-1.∆pds$/pds$ 
  
 It follows, by definition, that the change in the real stock of wealth is equal to real 
disposable income less real consumption 
 
(29) : (30) ∆v# ≡ yd# - c# :    ∆v$ ≡ yd$ - c$ 
 
 Real consumption is assumed to be determined by expected real disposable income and 
the opening stock of (real) wealth. As we shall see in more detail later, we have a two-stage 
decision, where households first decide on an overall flow of saving, and then choose how they 
will allocate their wealth or rather their expected wealth (Keynes 1936: 166).  
  
(31) : (32) c# = α1#.yd#e + α2#.v#-1    :   c$ = α1$.yd$e + α2$.v$-1 
 
where the subscript e denotes an expected value. 
 The formation of expectations about income (and therefore wealth) is no big deal in a 
well wrought stock flow model. Any way of forming expectations that is not downright perverse 
(such as would be the case if expectations were to  move in a way that ignores or compounds 
previous errors) will eventually lead to the same result. This is because errors lead inevitably to 
unwanted changes in stocks of wealth which lead, in turn, to self-correcting adjustments in 
subsequent periods. 
 This becomes more obvious when one notices that, by virtue of equations (29 - 32), the 
consumption function may alternatively be written as a wealth adjustment function,  
 ∆ve = α2(α3.yde - v-1),  
where α3 = (1 - α1)/α2. The system will come to rest (of a kind) when the changes in the real 
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stock of wealth are zero, implying that wealth targets, v*,  have been met, i.e., when v = α3.yd. 
 We shall assume in this model that the implicit targeted wealth to disposable income ratio 
is a positive function of the domestic rate of interest. The purpose of this assumption is to make 
sure that higher interest rates do have negative effects on aggregate demand, at least in the short 
run. This assumption will be useful in one variant of the model, where interest rates will be made 
endogenous. Since there are no investment expenditures by the producing sector, the only way 
for  higher interest rates to reduce domestic demand is for higher interest rates to raise the 
propensity to save and reduce consumption expenditures. We thus assume that α3 = α30 + α34.r , 
which, from what has been said above, thus implies: 
 
(33) : (34) α2# = (1-α1#)/(α30# + α4#.r#) : α2$ = (1-α1$)/(α30$ + α4$.r$)  
 
 For the rest of this section we have a raft of equations, most of them identities, which set 
out how real wealth accumulation and real consumption are inter-related with all the current 
price variables.  
 
The total volume of sales, s, is equal to the sum of its components: 
(35) : (36)  s# ≡ c# + g# + x# :   s$ ≡ c$ + g$ + x$ 
 
The value of sales is: 
(37) : (38)  S# ≡ s#.ps# : S$ ≡ s$.ps$ 
 
where ps is the average price of all sales. 
 The price level of sales, ps, is determined as a mark-up, ρ, on unit costs: 
(39) : (40)   ps# = (1 + ρ).(W#.N# + IM#)/s#    :   ps$ = (1 + ρ).(W$.N$ + IM$)/s$ 
 
where W is the nominal wage rate and N is employment. All profits earned as a result of the 
mark-up are assumed to be distributed instantaneously to the household sector. 
 
The price of domestic sales is 
(41) : (42) pds# ≡ (S# - X#)/(s# - x#)   :   pds$ ≡ (S$ - X$)/(s$ - x$) 
 
 The remaining relationships in this section are those necessary to complete the 
income/expenditure flow system. They describe, in turn, domestic sales value, DS; domestic 
sales volume, ds; nominal GDP, Y; real GDP, y; the GDP deflator, py; the value of consumption, 
C; the value of government expenditure, G; the tax yield, T, and employment, N.  
 
(43) : (44)  DS# ≡ S# - X# : DS$ ≡ S$ - X$  
(45) : (46)  ds# ≡ c# + g#   : ds$ ≡ c$ + g$ 
(47) : (48) Y# ≡ S# - IM#   : Y$ ≡ S$ - IM$ 
(49) : (50)  y# ≡ s# - im#     : y$ ≡ s$ - im$ 
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(51) : (52)          py# ≡Y#/y# :          py$ ≡ Y$/y$                                                   
(53) : (54)          C# ≡ c#.pds# :       C$ ≡ c$.pds$ 
(55) : (56)           G# ≡ g#.pds# :     G$ ≡ g$.pds$                                               
(57) : (58) T# = θ#(Y# + r#-1.B##-1 + r$-1.B#$-1..xr$):   T$ = θ$(Y$ + r$-1.B$$-1 + r#-1.B$#-1.xr#)   
(59) : (60)          N# ≡ y#/pr# :         N$ ≡ y$/pr$ 
 
where pr is productivity. 
 
4.4 Asset demands 
Up to this point, thanks mainly to the simplifying assumption that there is no inventory 
investment, we have been able to assume that supply (including the supply of labour) is 
instantaneously equal to demand. How about asset demands and supplies? Outside a stationary 
steady state all stocks and flows will be changing. Demands for assets will be originating from 
the private sectors’ wealth accumulation and desired asset allocation. Supplies of assets originate 
from the balance of both governments’ transactions. The way in which demands are brought into 
equivalence with supplies will determine how the system as a whole behaves. The manner of this 
reconciliation, which can take many forms, comprises the core of what this paper has to say. 
 The equations summarising how nominal wealth is created for the private sectors were 
given right at the beginning, in equations (2) and (4). The private sector’s ex ante allocation of 
wealth between the (only) three categories of financial asset available is determined according to 
Tobinesque principles: 
 
(61)    B##d =  V#e.(λ10 + λ11.r# - λ12.(r$ + dxr$e) - λ13.YD#e/V#e) 
(62)     B#$d = V#e.( λ20 - λ21.r# + λ22.(r$ + dxr$e) - λ23.YD#e/V#e) 
(63)     H#d   = V#e.( λ30 - λ31.r# - λ32.(r$ + dxr$e) + λ33.YD#e/V#e) 
 
(64)   B$$d = V$e.( λ40 + λ41.r$ - λ42.(r# + dxr#e) - λ43.YD$e/V$e) 
(65)   B$#d = V$e.( λ50 - λ51.r$ + λ52.(r# + dxr#e) - λ53.YD$e/V$e) 
(66)   H$d   = V$e.( λ60 - λ61.r$ - λ62.(r# + dxr#e) + λ63.YD$e/V$e) 
 
where, for each country, the sum of the constants is equal to one and the sum of the coefficients 
in each remaining column is equal to zero.  
 For bills the assumption is that the coefficient on its own interest rate will be positive and 
that on other interest rates will be negative. The subscript d denotes demand and readers must 
take note that where the asset is issued abroad this subscript signifies that the asset is 
denominated in domestic currency (see equations (74), (77) and (80) below). The subscript e 
denotes an expected value, while the prefix d denotes a proportional rate of change – thus the 
expected  rate of return on bills issued abroad equals the foreign rate of interest plus the change 
in the exchange rate which is expected to occur by the next period.  
(67) : (68) dxr$e =  ∆xr$e/xr$    : dxr#e =  ∆xr#e/xr# 
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 We could make the conventional neoclassical assumption that the expected rate of 
exchange is equal to the difference between domestic and foreign rates of interest, thereby 
establishing equivalence between expected total rates of return on the two assets. We would 
have: 
  xr$e = xr$ + (rb# - rb$).xr$-1         
  xr#e = xr# + (rb$ - rb#).xr#-1 
 These equations imply that uncovered interest parity holds. But according to the views 
held by traders, the above equations define the forward rate, not the expected future spot rate 
(Isard 1995: 78).  Banks and traders set the forward rate for their customers precisely on the 
basis of the above equations. The forward rate, relative to the spot rate, gives no indication of 
how the spot rate will move in the future.5 In other words, the forward rate relative to the spot 
rate does not help to predict the future spot rate. The forward rate cannot be the expected future 
spot rate, and hence the conventional neoclassical assumption is not helpful (Lavoie 2000; 2002-3). 
 Instead, we revert back to assuming that the expected exchange rate is a given, which 
might correspond to some fundamental exchange rate that investors believe will be realized 
sooner or later. When exchange rates become endogenous, the changes in realized exchange 
rates would have an impact on the expected change in exchange rates (the difference between the 
“fundamental” and the realized spot rates), and hence on the expected rates of return.6 
 If we really want the expected and the realized exchange rates to be equal in the very 
long run, we can introduce a further equation, which endogenizes the “fundamental” exchange 
rate, by making it slowly adjusting to the realized exchange rate. 
 
(69) : (70) xr$e = xr$e-1 + β(xr$ - xr$e-1) : xr#e = xr#e-1 + β(xr# - xr#e-1)    
 
 The demand for bills in each country is assumed to be made effective (carried through) 
on the basis of expected values for wealth, disposable income and the two expected rates of 
return. As expected values will not in general be realised, the amount of cash which ex post 
people actually find themselves holding at the end of each period is a residual between realised 
wealth and the demand for foreign and domestic bills (Lavoie and Godley 2001-2).  
 
(71) : (72) H#h = V# - B##d - B#$d :   H$h =  V$ - B$$d - B$#d 
 
                                                           
5  Isard (1995: 81-2) says that it is “widely acknowledged that interest differentials explain only a 
small proportion of subsequent changes in exchange rates” and “often mispredict the direction of 
change”. Tobin (1982: 124) himself provided some anecdotal evidence against the view that the 
forward rate is a predictor of future spot rates. 
6  Another, often used, possibility is to introduce some risk premium. Here it could be postulated that 
expected future rates depend on the foreign debt to GDP ratio (Smithin 2002-3). For instance, if the 
US were to accumulate too large a foreign debt, investors would start expecting a depreciation of 
the US dollar. 
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where the subscript h denotes that the cash is what people find themselves holding as opposed to 
what they plan to hold. It goes without saying that actual cash holdings are residual quantities 
which make it possible for people to transact under conditions of uncertainty. Cash is a buffer. 
 
4.5 Asset supplies 
What of asset supplies? The government, having taken decisions about tax rates and public 
expenditure authorisations, has no control over its surplus/deficit nor over the issue of bills to 
which this gives rise; nor has it any control over where the bills go to. Central banks (interest 
rates and exchange rates being treated as exogenous in the main model) will always exchange 
cash for bills and vice versa.  This is equivalent to saying that the supply of all assets to the 
private sector of each country passively matches demand. This is the post-Keynesian closure, 
which corresponds to the assertion that the money supply is endogenous and demand-led, as 
claimed by various post-Keynesian authors in the past (Robinson 1956, ch. 23; Kaldor 1982; 
Godley and Cripps 1983; Moore 1988). The present model formalizes this insight within an 
open-economy stock-flow consistent model.  
 In the case of assets issued by US institutions, government and central bank, and acquired 
by the private sector, domestic or foreign, we may write the following issuing requirements:  
 
(73) H$s = H$h 
(74)     B#$s = B#$d..xr# 
(75)     B$$s = B$$d 
 
where the subscript s denotes supply.  
 In the case of assets issued by Japanese (or British) institutions, and acquired by the 
private sector, domestic or foreign, we may write, symmetrically: 
 
(76)     H#s = H#h 
(77)     B$#s = B$#d.xr$ 
(78)     B##s = B##d 
 
 Monetarists and most mainstream economists, however, would object that the supply of 
high-powered money  – the supply of cash –  is determined by the asset side of the balance sheet 
identity of central banks (net of capital gains). The balance sheet identity does indeed apply, but 
since all of its elements are endogenous, it does not imply that cash is supply-led. In the case of 
the US central bank, column 9 of the balance sheet yields the following identity: 
 
(79)     H$s ≡  Bcb$d + or$.pg$ 
  
 Noting that the Japanese central bank is always free to buy US Treasury bills in the open 
market, so we can equate supply with demand, 
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(80)     Bcb#$s = Bcb#$d,xr# 
 
the value of US bills supplied to the US central bank is pinned down to:  
 
(81)     Bcb$s = B$s - B#$s - B$$s - Bcb#$s  
 
since each of the terms on the RHS of (81) has already been accounted for –  in equations (10), 
(74), (75) and (80) respectively.  
 Since we assume that central banks wish to keep interest rates at the level which they 
have set, it must be that the US central bank is ready to take on any amount of domestic US bills 
that is being left-over residually. Hence we have: 
 
(82) Bcb$d = Bcb$s  
 
 But now, for an instant, the model looks over-determined. Equation (79) defines the 
supply of US cash to US residents; it is said to depend on gold holdings (which are either given 
or depend on balance of payments surpluses) and on the value of bills held by the central bank, 
which is pinned down by equations (81) and (82). So how can it also be the case that this same 
supply of cash is demand determined as in (73) above? The answer is that there is no room, but 
also no need, for an equation lying down this equality. It is guaranteed by the accounting 
coherence of the system as a whole. As every column and every other row are in equivalence, it 
must be, under our version of Walras’ law, that this last equivalence holds as well. Accordingly 
equation (73) can (indeed for simulation purposes must) be “dropped” without altering the 
hypothesis that, at given interest rates, the supply of cash to dollar residents passively matches 
residual demand. And this equivalence is confirmed by all the numerical simulations we have 
carried out. Whatever is assumed about the exogenous variables of the model, it will always be 
found that the supply of cash to US residents which is being provided by the US central bank as 
a result of the evolution of its assets is exactly equal to the amount of cash that US residents are 
found to holding willingly, although there is no equation which makes this happen.7 
     We now look at the accounting of the # central bank. Reading across line 11 of the 
transactions matrix, we see that the value of Japanese government bills that is being supplied to 
the Japanese central bank is given, as a residual, by: 
 
(83)   Bcb#s = B#s - B##s - B$#s 
 
 Once again, we assume that the central bank, this time the # central bank, takes on any 
amount of domestic # bills which is left on the bill market, at the rate of interest that it sets. As a 
result we have: 
 
                                                           
7  Of course, the model could be constructed in such a way that some other equation would need to be 
“dropped”. But equation (73) seems an obvious candidate. 
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(84)  Bcb#d = Bcb#s 
 
 We have now written down equations describing demands for and supplies of all 
financial assets to the private sectors of both countries. But there is no reason, within the 
assumptions of the model, why total supplies of assets should be equal the sum of supplies to the 
private sectors. We need a safety valve.  
 And we have one at hand – for there is still one variable  for which there is no equation. 
Reading vertically, column 4 of the transactions matrix implies that the value of US Treasury 
bills, measured in Japanese currency, which the Japanese central bank acquires, is:  
 
(85)           ∆Bcb#$d = ∆H#s - ∆Bcb#d  - ∆or#.pg# + ∆xr$.Bcb#$s-1  
 
 The final term on the RHS of (85) above measures the capital gain (or loss) on existing 
holdings of US Treasury bills if the exchange rate should change (and it is to allow for this that 
the equation is written in first difference form). Equation (85) is saying that unless the Japanese 
bank buys gold, it must settle any residual discrepancy between the country’s current account 
balance and net private purchases of foreign issued assets by accumulating reserves in the form 
of US Treasury bills. Alternatively expressed, (85) describes the purchases of US Treasury bills 
which the Japanese central bank must make in order to prevent its exchange rate from floating up. 
 The model is nearly complete. There are two equations that still need to be defined. 
Under the assumption that the exchange rate variable is a given, it implies that the number of yen 
per dollar is the reciprocal of xr#. The very last equation of the model illustrates the application 
of the law of one price to gold, assuming that the price of gold in dollars, pg$, is a given. Hence 
we have the following two equations: 
 
 (86)   xr$ = 1/xr# 
 (87)    pg# = pg$.xr$ 
 
5. SOLUTIONS TO THE MAIN MODEL 
5.1 Practical implications 
Our simulation procedure is to start from a full stationary steady state, introduce a disturbance, 
and then inspect a sequence of solutions which will lead either to a new full steady state or to a 
hopefully intelligible form of instability. In the first exhibit we assume that “Japan” achieves an 
uncovenanted addition to exports in a step which is maintained indefinitely. Assuming that fiscal 
policy (the parameters 2 and G for each country), monetary policy (the rates of interest in both 
countries), the exchange rate and gold reserves are all fixed, the consequences for the trade 
account balance and the current account balance (CAB), as well as for domestic output and the 
government’s deficit of Japan are shown in Chart 1. 
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 Chart 1 shows how the level of total demand and output rises and then stabilises at a 
higher level in Japan, while the same things are happening in reverse in the US though this is not 
shown. The Japanese balance of trade and also output improves, but as monetary and fiscal 
policy, as defined above, and also the exchange rate are all fixed, there is no corrective 
mechanism in operation, so they continue indefinitely at their new higher level. But the current 
account balance, which includes interest flows on foreign assets or liabilities, while initially 
improving by the same amount as the balance of trade, proceeds thereafter to increase by ever 
larger – and accelerating – amounts as the Japanese central bank’s holdings of US Treasury bills 
increase, generating ever larger flows of interest payments. As to the Japanese government 
deficit, after a few wobbles, it is the exact mirror image of the current account surplus, i.e., the 
Japanese government surplus is increasing along with the Japanese current account surplus. 
These two variables are increasing exponentially.8 Exactly the same thing is happening in reverse 
in the US. The US government deficit and the US current account deficit are both increasing 
without limit. 
 Chart 2 shows the current account balance and the change in the value of US Treasury 
bills held by the Japanese central bank. Initially the two series differ because there is a change in 
the private income flows in both countries  which leads to a counterpart adjustment in stocks of 
US assets held privately in Japan and vice versa. In particular, since Japanese households earn 
higher revenues, they purchase additional bills, among which bills issued in the US. As a result, 
the negative capital account balance (net of the acquisition of official foreign reserves), partly 
compensates for the current account surplus for a while. Eventually, however, the income flow 
settles down at a new constant level and the changes in private wealth revert to zero. But the 
Japanese current account balance remains in surplus, while the overall government sector 
(including the central bank) keeps accumulating foreign assets on an equivalent scale, so the 
Japanese central bank’s acquisition of US bills comes to exactly match the current account 
surplus.   
 There is no intrinsic limit to these processes. The Japanese central bank does not lose 
control of its own monetary policy as it buys US Treasury bills, and there is no flooding of their 
economy with liquidity. This again can be seen on Chart 2, by checking the line illustrating 
changes in cash newly issued by the Japanese central bank, which quickly reverts to zero. This 
roughly constant stock of money occurs despite the enormous and exponential increase in 
foreign reserve assets.  This is because the increase in holdings of US Treasury bills is being 
compensated by the decrease in the Japanese central bank holdings of domestic bills, as can also 
be seen in Chart 2. The increases in private disposable income, consumption, output and the 
pressure of demand in Japan are no more than can be accounted for by the increase in exports 
                                                           
8  This result is also achieved by Lequain (2003). This is the main difference from previous models 
where gold stocks, carrying no interest, were the only means to hold foreign reserves, as in Godley 
(1999a) and Lavoie (2003b). In those models, the current account surplus remained constant, so 
that foreign reserves rose linearly. 
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and the multiplier effects of this. The increase in private wealth, and its allocation between cash 
and bills of each kind, is in no way different from what would have taken place had the increase 
in income originated in a quite different way, for instance as a result of a relaxation of fiscal 
policy. 
 All the same things are happening in reverse to the US economy. Initially, there is a 
slight reduction in the stock of cash and  the stock of US bills held by the Fed, as a result of a 
decrease in GDP, but afterwards all these remain constant, despite the current account deficit. 
Because the US dollar is the international currency, there is no need to “sterilize” anything on the 
part of the Fed. There is no fall in the foreign reserves of the US central bank; the financial assets 
that have to be provided, as a counterpart to the current account deficit, are being provided by the 
US Treasury. The accumulation of US Treasury bills by the Japanese central bank, and the 
payment of interest on these bills to it by the US government, is an entirely self-contained 
process which at no point affects private stocks and flows in either country. That this is the case 
can actually be observed in the introductory system describing arterial flows, in equations (7 )- 
(10) together with the text which immediately follows, where it is shown that receipts by the 
Japanese government derived from bills issued by the US government (r$-1.BCB#$-1.xr$) are 
components of both governments’ budget balance and also of both countries’ current account 
balance – but they do not enter the flows of private disposable income which are 
comprehensively given by the sum of the first four terms on the RHS of equations (1) and (3). 
 To judge from its recent behaviour (in 2003), it is not implausible to suppose that under 
such circumstances the US government would, in practise, relax fiscal policy enough to keep the 
level of GDP where it would otherwise have been, thereby generating an even larger trade deficit 
and an even larger public sector deficit. Under these circumstances the “real” thing that would be 
happening is that US residents would be producing the same amount as before but absorbing 
more goods and services than they are producing. Japanese residents would be producing more 
but absorbing less than they produce.9 There may be solid political or strategic reasons why both 
countries are happy to let the whole thing go on indefinitely.10  
 
5.2 Theoretical implications 
Is it right to call such accumulation of reserves by the Japanese central bank “intervention”; and 
is it right to describe the process as one in which the US is “having to attract $x billion per day” 
to finance its deficit”? Not really. What is happening, surely, is that Japanese exporters receive, 
for their increased sales abroad, an additional flow of dollars which they exchange with their 
                                                           
9  We are grateful to Randy Wray for pointing this out. 
10  It could be argued, as we did in a previous footnote, that at some point domestic and foreign 
investors will be scared by the rising debt to GDP ratio of the US government, or by the large 
foreign debt to GDP ratio of the US economy, and hence will reduce their demand for US bills. But 
as long as the Japanese central bank is willing to hold its foreign reserves in the form of US bills, 
this portfolio reshuffle can be handled within the described system, i.e., with fixed exchange rates 
and unchanged interest rates.  
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central bank for their own currency. The Japanese central bank finds itself with an equivalently 
rising stock of dollar balances which it exchanges for US Treasury bills. Beyond these two 
exchanges the Japanese central bank neither needs nor wants to do anything at all.       
 These “findings” are profoundly at odds with much conventional wisdom and with the 
received view that arises from the standard Mundell-Fleming model. Alan Greeenspan has been 
saying that Chinese accumulation of US Treasury bills is making it difficult for them to manage 
their monetary policy; but the above analysis strongly suggests that he is mistaken. Peter Kenen 
(1985: 669) writes, as many others:  “.... Reserve flows alter the money stock, undermining the 
influence of monetary policy.... The monetary approach to the balance of payments is built on 
this basic proposition”. But the monetary approach does not have a fully articulated monetary 
system in which the private sector allocates its wealth between money and other assets. In both 
countries, the private sector’s accumulation of wealth and its allocation between available assets 
are not in any way affected by these central bank operations beyond what is implied by the step 
change in disposable income. 
 Mainstream authors would say that the Japanese central bank of our model is “sterilizing” 
foreign reserves, by selling Japanese Treasury bills on the open market.  In a way, it is true. 
While the Japanese central bank’s foreign reserves are sky-rocketing, its holdings of domestic 
bills are dwindling, as already pointed out. But this is not the result of any intentional policy, 
where central bankers are actively intervening in financial markets. The Japanese central bank, 
just like the US one, is simply attempting to keep interest rates constant. Bills are provided to 
those who demand them at the set rate of interest.  The central bank provides cash on demand to 
its citizens. The reduction in domestic bills holdings by the Japanese central bank is essentially 
the consequence of the reduction in the amount of outstanding debt of the Japanese government. 
This can clearly go on indefinitely without any negative implication for the Japanese economy. 
 Chart 2 clearly illustrates the so-called compensation thesis that had been put forth by 
researchers at the Banque de France, and which was sometimes called the Banque de France 
view (Berger 1972; Lavoie 2001). The compensation thesis is the open-economy variant of the 
reflux mechanism, which asserts that there can never be any excess money. When the central 
bank’s foreign reserves increase, claims on the domestic economy decrease.The compensation 
thesis denies the validity of the Mundell-Fleming IS/LM/BP mechanism, which is a modern 
incarnation of the Rules of the game set by the “price-specie flow” mechanism”, that were said to 
function in the days of the gold standard. These rules, and variants of the IS/LM/BP model, both 
claimed that any surplus in the balance of payments would generate  increases in the money 
supply, and hence rising prices, which would tend to bring back the balance of payments towards 
equilibrium. Our main model is a formalized proof of the compensation phenomenon, which had 
been observed by Nurkse (1944) and Bloomfield (1959) to operate even during the gold standard 
period. 
 The compensation thesis was first set out as a mechanism operating within overdraft 
financial systems. As defined by Hicks (1974: 51), overdraft financial systems are characterized 
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by firms that must borrow from commercial banks, and by banks that must borrow from the 
central bank. Most economies in the world are of the overdraft type. Japan and China clearly run 
overdraft financial systems since a substantial proportion of their central bank claims are 
advances to the commercial banking sector. We would need a much more complicated model to 
properly reflect the institutional details of these two economies, since commercial banks and 
their advances from the central bank would need to be introduced. In reality, when these two 
countries experience balance of payments surpluses, compensation operates through the 
“advances to private banks” component of their central bank balance sheet. When Japanese or 
Chinese banks get loaded with foreign currency, they sell it to their respective central bank, 
acquiring domestic high-powered money with the proceeds. This cash is then used to reduce 
their outstanding debt vis-à-vis the central bank. Thus, on the asset side of the books of these 
overdraft economy central banks, the increase in foreign reserves (US Treasury bills) is 
compensated by a reduction in the advances granted to the domestic private banking sector. As 
in our main model, balance of payments surpluses do not generate any unwanted liquidity in an 
overdraft economy.    
 
6. ALTERNATIVE CLOSURES 
 
Let us now assume that the # country (which we now call “the UK”) is assumed to find itself in 
balance of payments deficit, but wants to maintain a fixed exchange rate and also to maintain full 
employment (that is, to not use deflationary fiscal policy). This is a simple and familiar story. 
Instead of being in a position to buy foreign Treasury bills on any scale whatever, the UK is 
obliged to spend reserves on whatever scale is necessary to keep its exchange rate fixed. To 
understand what is going on, we only need to take the case of Japan and its balance of payments 
surplus, and turn it upside down. Now, the UK central bank is selling its foreign exchange 
reserves – its US Treasury bills – at an exponentially growing pace. This, once more, can go on 
for quite a long time without any need for alarm. As a result of the negative export shock, 
domestic UK income will fall to a new steady state level, as will UK wealth, while the UK 
domestic interest rate and the exchange rate can be kept constant.  
 But this, in contrast to the US case, cannot go on forever. At some point, the UK central 
bank will run out of US bills, and it will have to sell gold to the US central bank (on the 
assumption that the latter will always be prepared to take it in settlement).But the UK central 
bank can only do this so long as it has gold reserves to spend. As the stock of gold approaches 
zero, the government is forced to act in order to bring exports into equivalence with imports. It 
has an awkward range of options, some of which will be discussed right at the end of this paper. 
In brief, it can raise interest rates, it can operate a restrictive fiscal policy, and it can float its 
currency.11 Alternatively it can try to borrow from the IMF, which is likely to impose the 
                                                           
11  There are yet other options if a country cannot borrow when its reserves are exhausted –  e.g., it can 
impose import restrictions. 
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condition that one or more of these options is followed. 
 Such possible responses are very familiar. What needs to be added is that, as with 
Japanese purchases of Treasury bills, the spending of gold reserves has no effect whatever on the 
private flow of income and wealth to the private sector beyond the generalised losses arising 
from the fact imports have gone up or exports have fallen plus multiplier effects – the price 
specie mechanism has no counterpart whatever in modern monetary systems (Godley 1999a). 
  
6.1 Flexible exchange rates 
We next assume that the UK central bank, faced with a step-up in imports, makes no reserve 
transactions, so changes in its domestic bill holdings are exactly equal to changes in the supply 
of cash, which is demand determined. Switching round equation (85) we have: 
 
(85F)    ∆Bcb#d =  ∆H#s - ∆or#.pg# - ∆Bcb#$d - ∆xrr$.Bcb#$s-1 
 
and hence under the assumption that reserves are not being modified (∆or#  = 0, and ∆Bcb#$s = 0), 
this means that: ∆Bcb#d =  ∆H#s. 
 But now, once again, we must face two equations with Bcb#d on the left-hand side: the 
new equation (85F) and equation (84), given by: 
 
(84)  Bcb#d = Bcb#s 
 
 We cannot drop equation (84), because we have already dropped one equation, equation 
(73). So the only option left is to invert equation (84), obtaining: 
 
(84F)  Bcb#s = Bcb#d 
 
 The amount of domestic bills demanded by the central bank will determine the amount of 
bills supplied by the UK Treasury to its central bank. But we are not yet out of trouble, for it is 
now the Bcb#s variable that makes its appearance on the left-hand side of two equations – 
equations (84F) and (83): 
 
(83) Bcb#s = B#s - B##s - B$#s 
 
 So the bumping process must continue. Switching round (83), we obtain: 
 
(83F)  B$#s = B#s - B##s - Bcb#s 
 
 The bumping is nearly over. There are once again two equations that have the B$#s 
variable on their left-hand side. Equation (77) is that other equation. But now we can rewrite 
equation (77) under the form: 
 
(77F)  xr$ = B$#d/B$#s   
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making the exchange rate xr$ endogenous and the alternative model with flexible exchange rates 
complete (with equations 77F, 83F, 84F and 85F replacing equations 77, 83, 84, 85). 
 The endogeneity of the exchange rate only finds itself (only can find itself) expressed in 
one single equation. But when the whole model is solved as a completely interdependent system, 
the effect works its way round so that the supply and demand for all assets are all brought into 
equivalence at (and by) the new exchange rate. What is happening (supposing there has been a 
spontaneous rise in UK imports) is that the private income and budget flows are immediately 
affected. The UK has a higher budget deficit; the US has a lower deficit, the UK has a current 
account deficit, the US has a balance of payments surplus. The net change in the supply of 
foreign assets causes sterling to fall in order to clear the market in all assets simultaneously.  
 But the dynamic response of the system as a whole is only just beginning. For as long as 
the balance of payments is non-zero this must be generating a change in the net supply of foreign 
denominated assets in each country causing a further change in the exchange rate. When 
exchange rates change, the absolute and relative prices of exports and imports all change; so 
trade volumes and values, income flows and accumulations of wealth all change. A train of 
sequences ensues – and continues until the balance of payments and all changes in stock 
variables revert to zero. Some of these processes are illustrated in Chart 3 and 4 
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 Chart 3 shows what would happen, according to the model, following a spontaneous step 
upwards in UK imports, on the assumption that reserves, fiscal policy and interest rates are not 
only exogenous but fixed. It shows how sterling depreciates at a decelerating rate until a new 
equilibrium is restored. It also shows how export and import prices both rise measured in 
sterling, accompanied by a deterioration in the terms of trade. 
 Chart 4 shows how the current account balance deteriorates initially but then reverts to 
zero. It also shows how the level of domestic output falls as a result of the direct and indirect 
(multiplier) effect of the fall in net export demand. However the fall in output, under flexible 
rates, is temporary. The deterioration in the terms of trade and the rise in import prices act so as 
to make real exports exceed real imports in the new steady state. As the current account balance 
reverts towards zero, the total demand for domestic product rises above what it was in the first 
place.  
 This outcome contrasts strongly with one in which the shock takes the form of a step fall 
in government expenditures (not shown here). In the latter case, there is an upward movement in 
the exchange rate. The relative price of imports falls and real imports rise relative to real exports. 
As in the previous case, the current account balance at current prices reverts to zero but the level 
of output is lower than at the outset. 
 
 
 
 26
6.2 Other possible closures 
We end by briefly describing two further closures. The first of these is very simple. It is 
relatively easy to rearrange the equations, following the procedure outlined in the previous 
subsection, so as to show how fiscal policy could be adjusted to preserve a fixed rate of 
exchange in the face of a deteriorated trade balance. The new fiscal stance has to be such that 
after allowing for all lags and feedbacks, the level of domestic output is  reduced to such an 
extent that the value of imports exactly equals that of exports. 
 An alternative way of facing off devaluation, in theory, is to raise the interest rate. Once 
again, it is easy to adapt the equations of the model to show how this would have to happen.  
Essentially we start from the flexible exchange rate model, but impose upon it that the exchange 
rate must remain constant. Hence another variable, which was previously assumed to be 
constant, now needs to be made endogenous and that will be the rate of interest on UK bills r#. 
To achieve this we need to make two modifications to the flexible exchange rate variant. First we 
need to invert equation (77F), by saying that the demand for UK bills by US residents, B$#d  is 
determined by the supply of such bills. But then we would have two equations determining the 
foreign demand for UK bills, since the portfolio demand equations already have the B$#d 
variable on the LHS.  So we also need to invert equation (65) to make it determine the rate of 
interest r#; for by the assumptions of the model, there will always be some pair of interest rates 
which will make all assets willingly held. We thus have the following two modifications: 
 
(77R)   B$#d = B$#s.xr#   
(65R)   r# = - dxr#e + {851.r$ - 850  + 853.YD$e/V$e + B$#d /V$e}/ 852 
 
 But a single adjustment to interest rates of this kind will only keep the asset market in 
equilibrium for a single period. If the “UK” goes on having an external deficit, there will have to 
be a further rise in the UK interest rate, to induce foreign inflows of capital and a positive capital 
account. As there is no mechanism in play to correct the deficit, we end up with an unstable 
situation – the interest rate has to go on rising for ever. Meanwhile, the balance of trade remains 
negative, while the current account balance keeps getting worse, due to the rising burden of 
interest payments that need to be made abroad, as shown in Chart 5. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have presented a model of a two-country economy that makes up a whole world. The model 
is set up with one country, the “US”, which provides Treasury bills which are accepted as  a 
reserve asset by the central bank of the other country. Goods are freely traded, and financial 
assets, although they are not perfect substitutes, are freely exchanged between countries. The 
main model and its alternative closures are all based on a rigorous and watertight system of stock 
and flow accounts. Income, consumption, government deficits, exports and imports of both 
countries are all endogenous variables in these models, as are the various price indices. In 
addition, wealth, the stock of money and the stock of bills held by households, or the stock of 
bills held by the central banks are all endogenous variables. Depending on the chosen closure, 
foreign reserves, the exchange rate  or one rate of interest can be made endogenous. The model 
evolves through time, solving dynamically from one period to the next. 
 In the main model with fixed exchange rates, we have shown that it is perfectly feasible 
for a country like the United States to run a trade deficit, as well as a current account deficit, 
while setting the rate of interest of its choice and without losing any control over the supply of 
high-powered money. Reciprocally, when other countries are running current account surpluses 
or balance of payments surpluses, their central banks can also peg interest rates at the level of 
their choice while still keeping the supply of money in line with the demand for it arising from 
private agents. Despite the fact that growing interest payments will enlarge the US current 
 28
account deficit at an exponential rate, GDP and the stock of high-powered money will converge 
to constant levels in both countries. On the other hand, when countries other than the US run 
balance of payments deficits, pressures to modify fiscal or monetary policy, or to move unto a 
floating exchange regime will be mounting, as official reserves gradually vanish and approach 
some minimal level. 
 Our view of the impact of balance of payments surpluses or deficits on the money stock 
can be contrasted with the standard view, which is conveyed by the authors of most textbooks 
and in the usual Mundell-Fleming IS/LM/BP model. Of course it could be objected to us that the 
Mundell-Fleming model is not anymore the model in use in top-tiered journals, but Isard (1995: 
116) in his recent survey points out that “the Mundell-Fleming model remains the ‘workhorse’ in 
academic discussions of stabilization policy for the open economy”. 
  The standard view is generally justified on the basis of a partial analysis of equations 
(79) or (85) – the balance sheet of the central bank, where its assets, among them foreign 
reserves, are said to supply-determine the stock of money. One of these authors for instance says: 
“Let us conclude this section by reiterating its central and fundamental message: in order to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate, a central bank must engage in foreign exchange transactions that 
prevent it from managing the monetary base so as to achieve other macroeconomic objectives” 
(McCallum 1996: 139).12 Our complete stock-flow model shows that such a statement is far from 
the truth. When the US is running a deficit and the rest of the world a surplus, central banks can 
clearly set interest rates at the level they feel is most appropriate. In our view, there is no “price-
specie flow” mechanism of any kind at work. 
 It is of course recognized by textbook authors that “central bank interventions in the 
foreign exchange market may not affect the home-country money stock if they are sterilized” 
(McCallum 1996: 138). But such sterilization is then said to be “weak and short-lived”, or it is 
claimed that such “sterilization” will lead to modified holdings by the private sector of claims on 
the US government or on foreign governments (Isard 1995: 140-3). We have argued in contrast 
that the so-called “sterilization” process is entirely self-contained and affects neither the flows 
nor the stocks of the private economy. In addition, we object to such a process being called 
sterilization, and believe that the word “compensation” process is much more appropriate. As 
long as the central bank wishes to peg the exchange rate and its main interest rate, a 
compensation mechanism will operate quite automatically, as part of the defensive operations 
conducted daily to maintain settlement balances at their required level. The central bank will 
neutralize the net impact of any public flow between its balance sheet and that of the financial 
                                                           
12  McCallum (1996: 137) claims that “each exchange by the central bank of dollars for foreign 
currency has the effect of changing the home country’s stock of ‘high-powered money’ 
(alternatively referred to as ‘base money’ or the ‘monetary base”, with purchases of foreign 
exchange increasing (and sales decreasing) the stock of base money”. He presents the balance sheet 
of five central banks, not realizing that in two of them, France and Germany, the claims on 
domestic banks are more than five times greater than the claims on central government – both 
being overdraft economies! 
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system (through repos or any other means at its disposal) in order to keep the overnight rate (the 
federal funds rate) at or near its target rate (Eichner 1985, ch. 5; Howard 1998).  
  In the rest of the paper, we have shown that the main model could be quickly adopted to 
yield alternative closures, using the same method, with no black holes. Flexible exchange rates 
and flexible fiscal policy yielded a stable model; endogenous interest rates generated instability.  
 It must be emphasised that the use of the different closures, as presented here, does not 
correspond in any straightforward way to different policy regimes. The closures are not in any 
general sense alternatives to one another. It would, for instance, be perfectly possible for a 
country which had a depreciating currency to switch course and use fiscal policy or put up 
interest rates. Government expenditures would be gradually reduced, or interest rates would be 
pushed up, as long as the depreciation goes on. One could also assume a fixed exchange regime, 
where government expenditures and interest rates are gradually modified by the fiscal and the 
monetary authorities in an attempt to reduce the balance of payments deficit (Lavoie 2003a). Our 
experience with various closures is that, whatever the institutional background, some results are 
being systematically achieved when a particular closure is being adopted.  
 The important thing to bring out is that, there is not, in general, as Lance Taylor (2002)  
has forcefully argued, an equilibrium towards which economies and exchange rates are moving. 
Any attempt to model econometrically the behaviour of exchange rates on the assumption that 
they are moving towards some underlying rate which conforms with “fundamentals” is doomed 
to failure.  
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